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I feel like a fun troll for modest epistemology extremists would be: "Wow, you sure seem confident in 'modest epistemology', for someone who isn't viewed as an expert on epistemology. I'm going to adopt the views of the most widely-recognized thinker who seems to have anything to say about this topic"
in reply to Ben Weinstein-Raun

in fairness the post that I think of as the original epistemic modesty post does anticipate this objection (section 'Immodestly modest?')
in reply to Ben Millwood

I mean, sure, but my mind unfairly translates that section into "yeah, you're right, but I can't be bothered to actually change my mind just because of something like that. Don't @ me."

He points out that many popular views are self-defeating, and is like "well surely all these self-defeating views can't be wrong!" But, like, yes they can? And also this is an especially apt case, since the question is directly about what-to-believe! You're not even really going up a meta level.

in reply to Ben Weinstein-Raun

Yeah I don't necessarily buy his counterargument either, just wanted to point out that it has been discussed :P

I guess in fact if you believe in epistemic modesty, deferring to the fact that most people don't believe in it doesn't actually fix your problem, because that tells you to not defer and follow your own beliefs, but then your own beliefs tell you to defer again. It's not just that it recommends that you don't use it, it's actively paradoxical.

I think you and I probably disagree about how much it matters to have an inconsistent / seemingly arbitrary "do epistemic modesty unless it's paradoxical, then don't" rule. I think I can make it sound more reasonable if it's something like "it's surprising if you alone are right while a large number of relevant experts are wrong, so usually reject this thesis, but in some cases this rejection is even more surprising / obviously incorrect, so in that case you have to stick with your beliefs".

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